According to Arkady Plotnitsky, images of thought realize themselves in scientific processes. His essay “The Image of Thought and the Sciences of the Brain” describes their influence on the disciplines of neuroscience, psychiatry, and psychology (Plotnitsky 2010).
Locating truth as exterior to the subject, data science and Platonic thought both treat the vagaries of human interpretation as a barrier to their object. Per McQuillan’s argument, data science reinforces the Platonic vision which unites truth with totality, objectivity, and goodness, and discounts the value of the subjective and particular.
The digital mandate to representation seals off all terra incognita.
Because the digital image of thought idealizes representation, it heeds no limit to that which may be reconstructed in digital and mental formats.
Its effect on thinking may be likened to the infinite scroll, a web design technique which automates the renewal of content as one navigates across a website or application. The infinite scroll presents figures at an instantaneous pace that preempts the mental production of difference in itself. The thinker always remains within the remit of its offerings, which is to say that they cannot help but acknowledge its endless procession of prefabricated forms. The image’s relative infinity is taken as absolute, as no lines of flight are available to carry the thinker away. Computers “think” or yield information in this manner, as their outputs are indelibly linked (however contingently) with inputs.
These features have made digital information valuable in every conceivable sense. Digital capitalism is at least as dependent on the material world as the economic systems that predates it.
When data are able to move quickly, accumulate without measurable limit, and take on seemingly endless guises, they are ideally equipped to contribute to an economic system which presupposes limitless expansibility.
Their speed and modularity, which accounts for their economic value, is an effect of their immutable structure. In computer systems, this structure functions as a template for information processing. As an image of thought, it delimits mental activities in compliance with the technical requirements of computability.
The relationship between the rigidity of data and the malleability of digital media may appear as a paradox.
Yet the conceivable breadth of digital outputs does not exceed that of pen, paper, and other analog means of production. What distinguishes the digital from the analog is not the former’s range of expression, but the extent to which it is taken as a faithful bearer of the real.
Computers are granted the capacity for verisimilitude by the structural inflexibility of the datum.
As a precursor to human thought, the digital image would endow minds with the ability to function as virtually inexhaustible wellsprings of concepts. The currency of these conceptual outputs accords with the degree to which they accurately capture the external world, and their valorization transforms thinking minds into workers par excellence.
To characterize machines as “intelligent” is to conceal those aspects of mentality which cannot be translated into economic value. My presentation of the digital image of thought mobilizes Deleuze and Guattari against this campaign of obfuscation.
The fact that [Turing's] prediction has proven true does not render the figure of the “thinking machine” any less absurd.
For my part, I can’t imagine why anyone with real power over AI wouldn’t slam on the brakes so that we can try to integrate these extraordinary technologies at something approaching a normal mammal pace
With Altman, as with so many in this biz, the computational bias of computer engineering has bloomed into a totalizing psychology. As the CEO put it in a famous tweet, referring to Emily M. Bender’s critique mentioned above: “I am a stochastic parrot, and so r u.” In other words, our brains are just running algorithms, making statistical guesses, and generating predictive processes that compose our reality almost entirely from the inside

Jobs increasingly fall into one of two categories: Either you tell computers what to do for a living or they tell you what to do.
Unlike humans, for example, who are endowed with a universal grammar that limits the languages we can learn to those with a certain kind of almost mathematical elegance, these programs learn humanly possible and humanly impossible languages with equal facility.
While scientists certainly seek theories that have a high degree of empirical corroboration, as the philosopher Karl Popper noted, “we do not seek highly probable theories but explanations; that is to say, powerful and highly improbable theories.”
True intelligence is also capable of moral thinking.
Note, for all the seemingly sophisticated thought and language, the moral indifference born of unintelligence. Here, ChatGPT exhibits something like the banality of evil: plagiarism and apathy and obviation.
Of the laws governing the mechanical slaves, I will menIon only three: automaIsm, uniformity, and anonymity
We are learning the laws and the jargon of our slaves, so that we can give them orders. And so, gradually and impercepIbly, we are renouncing our human qualiIes and our own laws.

Leibniz felt that the moderns had erred in ascribing this godless model to life itself. He set out to restore the uniqueness of life by positing that infinity was its defining feature. For Leibniz, even in their smallest parts organisms were machines – and therefore were machines ad infinitum, akin to onions that could never be completely peeled. Leibniz
If there is an origin trauma in Giger’s work, I suggest it is really the trauma of origins in the ancient Gnostic sense: of spirits who find themselves born, painfully, even hopelessly, into the world of matter, with all of matter’s pains, frustrations, and limitations.
While the “fall of spirit into matter” seems like a purely theological or mythic narrative, it has an uncanny reflection in what has become the accepted, fully materialistic account of the origins of complex life forms on Earth. The theory, first proposed by the Russian botanist Konstantin Mereschkowsky in 1926 and then supported by the discoveries of biologist Lynn Margulis (below) in the early 1970s, is now entrenched in biology textbooks: Over two billion years ago, changes in Earth’s environment such as an increasingly oxygen-rich atmosphere led bacteria to adapt in new ways, including by merging and coopting each other, sharing their genes and unique bacterial talents. Through a process called endosymbiosis, independent creatures engulfed each other and “grew together”—most often, perhaps, pointlessly and painfully, but every now and then forming mutually beneficial and stable unions that shaped subsequent life. This was the origin of the first complex, nucleated cells or eukaryotes.
Margulis’s story about our merging bacterial ancestors is inspiring and cool … as long as you hold it at a 2-billion-year arm’s reach. Can you imagine the horror of being forced to live out your life immobilized inside another organism?
I am inclined to take Lacan’s jouissance as essentially the same thing—as spirit or consciousness, the thing that separates us from inert matter.
Giger’s world shows us this dark threat of cyborg endosymbiosis: not to be simply augmented by machines (or even simply replaced by them) but to be parasitized and engulfed by them in a kind of numbed ecstasy that somehow masks the violence being done.
Donna Haraway suggested that even to hope for such a choice could be a mirage, because we have always been cyborgs: Language, culture, tools, all act on and in the body so thoroughly we could never unplug from them.
For Bacon and Newton, sheath'd in dismal steel, their terrors hang Like iron scourges over Albion: reasonings like vast serpents Infold around my limbs, bruising my minute articulations.
In this class, we consider how we might encounter the divine (in whatever guise) as it manifests in exotica music, professional wrestling, avant-garde Happenings, and other cultural forms. And we will consider the all-important pro-wrestling principle of kayfabe: maintaining and protecting the Inside of a divine encounter from a hostile and uncomprehending Outside.
The Otherworld is always imagined as beginning at the edge of our known world....Scientism recognizes no Otherworld, but, as I intimated in my 'little history of daimons', daimonic reality has a way of subverting it. Thus scientism constructs its own literal versions of a transcendent and and immanent Otherworld. The former appears in the weird models of the universe articulated by astronomers and cosmologists; the latter appears in the speculations of nuclear physicists.
The subtaomic Otherworld has its own elegance and a certain stark beauty, as the physicists are keen on emphasizing; but iut is grey and meaningless compared to the world William Blake saw in a grain of sand.
the Zone is usually a singular, often unmoving place of anomalous materiality. Importantly distinct from magical phenomena themselves, “[t]he zone is the region, spatial or temporal or both in which the phenomena may occur;” it is an “‘order’ that is outside order.”
Indeed, it is my contention that Zones are instances where the noumenal mixes with the phenomenal; where the Outside intrudes on the Inside. The beaches of Kant’s Island of Reason are littered with constantly evolving and changing tide pools.
systematization and standardization of the human experience in the understandable world of the phenomenal is our treasured Inside...Furthermore, this set of rules that organize our experience of space and time “consistently and predictably” produce a homogeneity, a sameness that determines what Amy Ireland calls our “anthropomorphic regime.” Such a regime, she goes on, creates a sense of normalcy and harmony amongst us insofar as everything is “ordered, familiar, comfortable, and homely.”
Through the fabulations of fantasy, we test the Real, sounding its depths and learning, again and again, that there is more to this universe than any dogmatic con- strual would allow.
Unfortunately, getting any of it to work will require one thing that no book can give you, ... This is the seriousness that is integral to real imaginal play. In magic, you play for keeps or don’t play at all.
From JF Martel : Magic, Science, Religion and the Scope of Rationality
14:47:36 From Dylan Burns : The psychologist Nathan Schwartz Salant used an image of a [[Klein bottle]] (3D version of moebius strip) to describe the therapeutic encounter. Both parties are in the bottle and in participation, and both are outside it, reflecting on it.
If Weird Studies has an overarching theme, it may be the hunch that the fundamental principle of reality is neither inert matter nor pristine mind, but pure event—that is to say, drama, story, poesy, act. There is perhaps no better way into this thought space than with the philosopher Nick Land’s *hyperstition, *the notion that certain subjective imaginings can, in time, become objective realities.
We will argue that by embracing hyperstition, one can make life a transformative process on the cosmic scale, a sacrament that leaves nothing unaltered, not even the remotest star.



fissile core of Macbeth
a cinema of the seer, not of the agent (actant)
What you see in a Kubrick film is the conscious manifestation of an unconscious play of forces taking place beneath the celluloid surface. Kubrick is more concerned with psychic forces – archetypal, philosophical and cosmic – than he is with the emotional life of his characters or the diversion of his audience.
The huge arms of the wind were making attempts – mighty, circular, futile – to embrace the flakes as they sped
Before I ventured upon this field of inquiry I spent many years of study upon the rational aspect of that supreme Reality we call God , and the results of my work are contained in my books, Naturalietische und religiose Weltansicht (Eng. Tr. Naturalism and Religion , London, 1907), and Die Kant-friesisclie Religions-Philosophie. And I feel that noone ought to concern himself with the 'Numen ineffabile' who has not already devoted assiduous and serious study to the 'Ratio aeterna'.
What is maintained in this book is, in fact, that religion is something not only natural but also, in the strict sense of the word, paradoxical. It is a real knowledge of, and real personal communion with, a Being whose nature is yet above knowledge and transcends personality.
We generally take holy as meaning completely good ; it is the absolute moral attribute, denoting the consummation of moral goodness
It will be our endeavour to suggest this unnamed Something to the reader as far as we may, so that he may himself feel it. There is no religion in which it does not live as the real innermost core, and without it no religion would be worthy of the name. It is pre-eminently a living force in the Semitic religions, and of these again in none has it such vigour as in that of the Bible. Here, too, it has a name of its own, viz. the Hebrew קדוש, to which the Greek ayios and the Latin sanctus, and, more accurately still, sacer, are the corresponding terms.
There you have a self-confessed feeling of dependence , which is yet at the same time far more than, and something other than, merely a feeling of dependence. Desiring to give it a name of its own, I propose to call it creature-consciousness or creature-feeling. It is the emotion of a creature, abased and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures.
Religious dread (or awe ) would perhaps be a better designation. Its antecedent stage is daemonic dread (cf. the horror of Pan) with its queer perversion, a sort of abortive off-shoot, the dread of ghosts . It first begins to stir in the feeling of something uncanny , eerie , or weird . It is this feeling which, emerging in the mind of primeval man, forms the starting-point for the entire religious development in history.
And all ostensible explanations of the origin of religion in terms of animism or magic or folk psychology are doomed from the outset to wander astray and miss the real goal of their inquiry, unless they recognize this fact of our nature primary, unique, underivable from anything else to be the basic factor and the basic impulse underlying the entire process of religious evolution.
In the first place, it is patent from many passages of the Old Testament that this Wrath has no concern whatever with moral qualities. There is something very baffling in the way in which it is kindled and manifested. It is, ashas been well said, like a hidden force of nature , like stored-up electricity, discharging itself upon any one who comestoonear. It is incalculable and arbitrary . Any one who is accustomed to think of deity only by its rational attributes must see in this "Wrath" mere caprice and wilful passion.
For one of the chiefest and most general features of Mysticism is just this self-depreciation (so plainly parallel to the case of Abraham) the estimation of the self, of the personal 1 , as something not perfectly or essentially real, or even as mere nullity, a self-depreciation which comes to demand its own fulfilment in practice in rejecting the delusion of selfhood, and so makes for the annihilation of the self.
Whatis really characteristic of this stage is not – as the theory of Animism would have us believe – that men are here concerned with curious entities, called souls or spirits , which happen to be invisible. Representations of spirits and similar conceptions are rather one and all early modes of rationalizing a precedent experience, to which they are subsidiary....They are the source from which springs, not religion, but the rationalization of religion, which often ends by constructing such a massive structure of theory and such a plausible fabric of interpretation, that the mystery is frankly excluded.
This elusive quality it is, which causes the thought of whiteness, when divorced from more kindly associations, and coupled with any object terrible in itself, to heighten that terror to the furthest bounds. Witness the white bear of the poles, and the white shark of the tropics; what but their smooth, flaky whiteness makes them the transcendent horrors they are? That ghastly whiteness it is which imparts such an abhorrent mildness, even more loathsome than terrific, to the dumb gloating of their aspect. So that not the fierce-fanged tiger in his heraldic coat can so stagger courage as the white-shrouded bear or shark
I shall call modern the art which devotes its "little technical expertise " (so n "petit tecbnique "), as Diderot usd to say, to present the fact that the unrepresentable exists. To make visible that there is something which can be conceived and which can neither be seen nor be visioble: this is what is at stake in modern painting.
The atom bomb and the birth of Christ belong to the same order: both are events which, having happened once in time, have continued to happen outside of time ever since
So that as rational metaphysics teaches that man becomes all things by understanding them, this imaginative metaphysics shows that man becomes all things by not understanding them. For when he does not understand, he makes the things out of himself and becomes them by transforming himself into them. — Giambattista Vico, The New Science (Book II, §405)
Your nomination is spot-on: If Bergsonian mathematics exists, it must look something like Laws of Form - simultaneously rigorous and mystical, formal and generative, mathematical and philosophical, accepted and rejected.
a) The scientific intellect cannot measure time; what it measures are simultaneities in space.
b) When we “measure” time, we substitute spatial positions for temporal flow (durée).
c) The intellect, by nature, aims at fixities, “things-made,” rather than processes, or “things-in-the-making.”
d) Duration is the continuous, qualitative, and irreversible flow of becoming, necessarily excluded by the intellect.
e) Duration is not “psychological time.”
f) It is clock-time, that is artificial, conventional, and thus, psychological. It is a spatialized construct useful for science.
g) Science (analysis) is valid only in a universe that endures, and thus presupposes duration even while excluding it.
h) There is a difference in kind, not merely in degree, between space and time: the first cut.
i) Intuition makes the cut: it must become the method by which duration can be grasped directly.
j) To live is to endure: duration is the substance of existence itself, not an added dimension.
BERGSON: "Illusion!" You see? This is where we diverge irreconcilably. For you, duration is an illusion created by mechanisms. For me, duration is the most real thing—it's your mechanical snapshots that are the illusion, useful fictions we create for practical purposes.
MINSKY: [smiling] Maybe we're both right. Maybe "illusion" is the wrong word. Perhaps what I should say is: the mechanisms create something real that transcends them—a genuine experience of flow that exists at a higher level. The experience is real; I'm just trying to explain how it could arise from parts that don't themselves flow.
I think their disagreement would center on whether mechanism can explain lived experience, but they'd find common ground in rejecting passive models of mind and in recognizing that consciousness involves complex temporal relations rather than simple "awareness of the present moment."
For it is possible to sum up our conclusions as to pure perception by saying that there is in matter something more than, but not something different from, that which is actually given.
But between this perception of matter and matter itself there is but a difference of degree and not of kind, pure perception standing toward matter in the relation of the part to the whole.
This amounts to saying that matter cannot exercise powers of any kind other than those which we perceive. It has no mysterious virtue; it can conceal none.
The truth is that there is one, and only one, method of refuting materialism: it is to show that matter is precisely that which it appears to be. Thereby we eliminate all virtuality, all hidden power, from matter and establish the phenomena of spirit as an independent reality. But to do this we must leave to matter those qualities which materialists and spiritualists alike strip from it: the latter that they may make of them representations of the spirit, the former that they may regard them only as the accidental garb of space...This, indeed, is the attitude of common sense with regard matter, and for this reason common sense believes in spirit.
We must now add that, as pure perception gives us the whole or at least the essential part of matter (since the rest comes from memory and is super-added to matter), it follows that memory must be, in principle, a power absolutely independent of matter.
The first concerns the office of the brain in perception: we maintain that the brain is an instrument of action, and not of representation.
We become conscious of these mechanisms as they come into play; this consciousness of a whole past of efforts stored up in the present is indeed also a memory, but a memory profoundly different from the first, always bent upon action, seated in the present and looking only to the future. It has retained from the past only the intelligently coordinated movements which represent the accumulated efforts of the past; it recovers those past efforts, not in the memory-images which recall them, but in the definite order and systematic character with which the actual movements take place. In truth it no longer represents our past to us, it acts it; and if it still deserves the name of memory, it is not because it conserves bygone images, but because it prolongs their useful effect into the present moment.
Vital interiority. Life cannot be reduced to mechanical causation or the blind play of natural selection. Beneath the adaptive mechanisms that science studies, there is an interior, creative effort, an élan vital, which generates living forms and whose freedom and inventiveness mechanism presupposes but cannot explain. (JFM summary)
Forms of life. On Earth, the élan vital expresses itself in three divergent tendencies, modes of maintaining and channeling its act of self-creation ( autopoiesis):
Thus we must, consciously or unconsciously, have made use of the law of causality. Moreover, the more sharply the idea of efficient causality is defined in our mind, the more it takes the form of a mechanical causality. And this scheme, in its turn, is the more mathematical according as it expresses a more rigorous necessity. That is why we have only to follow the bent of our mind to become mathematicians. But, on the other hand, this natural mathematics is only the rigid unconscious skeleton beneath our conscious supple habit of linking the same causes to the same effects; and the usual object of this habit is to guide actions inspired by intentions, or, what comes to the same, to direct movements combined with a view to reproducing a pattern. We are born artisans as we are born geometricians, and indeed we are geometricians only because we are artisans. Thus the human intellect, inasmuch as it is fashioned for the needs of human action, is an intellect which proceeds at the same time by intention and by calculation, by adapting means to ends and by thinking out mechanisms of more and more geometrical form. Whether nature be conceived as an immense machine regulated by mathematical laws, or as the realization of a plan, these two ways of regarding it are only the consummation of two tendencies of mind which are complementary to each other, and which have their origin in the same vital necessities.
These fleeting intuitions, which light up their object only at distant intervals, philosophy ought to seize, first to sustain them, then to expand them and so unite them together. The more it advances in this work, the more will it perceive that intuition is mind itself, and, in a certain sense, life itself: the intellect has been cut out of it by a process resembling that which has generated matter. Thus is revealed the unity of the spiritual life. We recognize it only when we place ourselves in intuition in order to go from intuition to the intellect, for from the intellect we shall never pass to intuition...Philosophy introduces us thus into the spiritual life.
Life as a whole, from the initial impulsion that thrust it into the world, will appear as a wave that rises, and which is opposed by the descending movement of matter.
I was indeed very much struck to see how real time, which plays the leading part in any philosophy of evolution, eludes mathematical treatment. Its essence being to flow, not one of its parts is still there when another part comes along.
Things and events happen at certain moments; the judgment which determines the occurence of the thing or the event can only come after them; it therefore has its date. But this date at once fades away, in virtue of the principle deep-rooted in our intellect, that all truth is eternal. If the judgment is true now, it seems to us it must always have been so. (p22)
These conclusions on the subject of duration were,. seemed to me, decisive. Step by step they led me to raise intuition to the level of a philosophical method, “Intuition,” however, is a word whose use caused me some degree of hesitation. Of all the terms which designate a mode of knowing, it is still the most appropriate; and yet it leads to a certain confusion. Because a Schelling, a Schopenhauer and others have already called upon intuition, because they have more or less set up intuition in opposition to intelligence, one might think that I was using the same method. But of course, their intuition was an immediate search for the eternal! Whereas, on the contrary, for me it was a question, above all, of finding true duration. Numerous are the philosophers who have felt how powerless conceptual thought is to reach the core of the mind. Numerous, consequently, are those who have spoken of a supra-intellectual faculty of intuition. But as they believed that the intelligence worked within time, they have concluded that to go beyond the intelligence consisted in getting outside of time. They did not see that intellectualized time is space, that the intelligence works upon the phantom of duration, not on duration itself. that the elimination of time is the habitual, normal, commonplace act of our understanding...to pass from intellection to vision, from the relative to the absolute, is not a question of getting outside of time (we are already there); on the contrary, one must get back into duration and recapture reality in the very mobility which isits essence. -p30
For the concepts which the intelligence furnishes, the intuition simply substitutes one single concept which includes them all and which consequently is always the same, by whatever name it is called: Substance, Ego, Idea, Will....How much more instructive would be a truly intuitive metaphysics, which would follow the undulations of the real! True, it would not embrace in a single sweep the totality of things; but for each thing it would give an explanation which would fit it exactly, and it alone. It would not begin by defining or describing the systematic unity of the world: who knows if the world is actually one? -p31
It is true that philosophy then will demand a new effort for each new problem. No solution will be geometrically deduced from another. No important truth will be achieved by the prolongation of an already acquired truth. We shall have to give up crowding universal science potentially into one principle.
There is, however, a fundamental meaning: to think intuitively is to think in duration. Intelligence starts ordinarily from the immobile, and reconstructs movement as best it can with immobilities in juxtaposition. Intuition starts from movement, posits it, or rather perceives it as reality itself, and sees in immobility only an abstract moment, a snapshot taken by our mind, of a mobility.
no matter what name you give to the “thing itself,” whether you make of it the Substance of Spinoza, the Ego of Fichte, the Absolute of Schelling, the Idea of Hegel, or the Will of Schopenhauer, it will be useless for the word to present itself with its well-defined signification: it will lose it; it will be emptied of all meaning from the moment it is applied to the totality of things. Speaking only of the last of these great “syntheses,” isn’t it evident that a Will is only will on condition that it is set off against what does not will? How then is mind to be set off against matter, if matter is itself will? To place will everywhere is the same as leaving it nowhere, for it is to identify the essence of what I feel within myself—duration, outpouring, continuous creation—with the essence of what I perceive in things, where there is evidently repetition, previsibility, necessity. It makes little difference to me if one says “Everything is mechanism” or “Everything is will”: in either case everything is identical. In both cases, “mechanism” and “will” become synonyms of “being” and consequently synonyms of each other. Therein lies the initial vice of philosophical systems. They think they are telling us something about the absolute by giving it a name. But once again the word can have a definite meaning when it designates a thing; it loses that meaning as soon as you apply it to all things. -p48
Man is essentially a manufacturer. Nature, in denying him ready-made instruments like those the insects have, for example, has given him intelligence, that is to say, the power of inventing and constructing an indefinite number of tools.
And the essential object of society is to insert a certain fixity into universal mobility. Societies are just so many islands consolidated here and there in the ocean of becoming. -p82
As far as I am concerned, I value scientific knowledge and technical competence as much as intuitive vision. I believe that it is of man’s essence to create materially and morally, to fabricate things and to fabricate himself. Homo faber is the definition I propose. Homo sapiens, born of the reflection Homo faber makes on the subject of his fabrication, seems to me to be just as worthy of esteem as long as he resolves by pure intelligence those problems whicqh depend upon it alone. -p84
My initiation into the true philosophical method began the moment I threw overboard verbal solutions, having found in the inner life and important field of experiment. -p89
Some fifty years ago I was very much attached to the philosophy of Spencer. I perceived one fine day that, in it, time served no purpose, did nothing. Nevertheless, I said to myself, time is something. Therefore it acts, What can it be doing? Plain common sense answered: time is what hinders everything from being given at once. It retards, or rather it is retardation. It must therefore, be elaboration. -p93 (emph added)
If we compare the various ways of defining metaphysics and of conceiving the absolute, we shall find, despite apparent discrepancies, that philosophers agree in making a deep distinction between two ways of knowing a thing. The first implies going all around it, the second entering into it. The first depends on the viewpoint chosen and the symbols employed, while the second is taken from no viewpoint and rests on no symbol. Of the first kind of knowledge we shall say that it stops at the relative; of the second that, wherever possible, it attains the absolute. –p159
Take, for example, the movement of an object in space. I perceive it differently according to the point of view from which I look at it, whether from that of mobility or of immobility. I express it differently, furthermore, as I relate it to the system of axes or reference points, that is to say, according to the symbols by which I translate it. And I call it relative for this double reason: in either case, I place myself outside the object itself. When I speak of an absolute movement, it means that I attribute to the mobile an inner being and, as it were, states of soul; it also means that I am in harmony with these states and enter into them by an effort of imagination.
It follows that an absolute can only be given in an intuition, while all the rest has to do with analysis. We call intuition here the sympathy by which one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it. -p161
If there exists a means of possessing a reality absolutely, instead of knowing it relatively, of placing oneself within it instead of adopting points of view toward it, of having the intuition of it instead of making the analysis of it, in short, of grasping it over and above all expression, translation or symbolical representation, metaphysics is that very means. Metaphysics is therefore the science which claims to dispense with symbols. -p162
Like empiricism, [rationalism] tries to bind these fragments to one another in order to reconstitute the unity of the person. Like empiricism, in short, it sees the unity of the person elude its grasp like a phantom each time it tries to lay hold of it. -p173
That the personality has unity is certain; but such an affirmation does not teach me anything about the extraordinary nature of this unity which is the person. That our self is multiple I further agree, but there is in it a multiplicity which, it must be recognized, has nothing in common with any other. What really matters to philosophy is to know what unity, what multiplicity, what reality superior to the abstract one and the abstract multiple is the multiple unity of the person.
I. There is an external reality which is given immediately to our mind. Common sense is right on this point against the idealism and realism of the philosophers.
II. This reality is mobility.There do not exist things made, but only things in the making, not states that remain fixed, but only states in process of change.
III. Our mind, which seeks solid bases of operation (point d’apergu), has as its principal function, in the ordinary course of life, to imagine states and things.
IV. The difficulties inherent in metaphysics, the antinomies it raises, the contradictions into which it falls, the division into opposing schools and the irreducible oppositions between systems, are due in large part to the fact that we apply to the disinterested knowledge of the real the procedures we use currently with practical utility as the aim.
V. It was bound to fail. This is the impotence, and this alone, pointed out by the skeptical, idealistic and critical doctrines, all those doctrines, in fact, which question our mind’s ability to attain the absolute. But it does not follow from the fact that we fail to reconstitute living reality with concepts that are rigid and ready-made, that we could not grasp it in any other manner.
VI. But the truth is that our mind is able to follow the reverse procedure. It can be installed in the mobile reality, adopt its ceaselessly changing direction, in short, grasp it intuitively. But to do that, it must do itself violence, reverse the direction of the operation by which it ordinarily thinks, continually upsetting its categories, or rather, recasting them. In so doing it will arrive at fluid concepts, capable of following reality in all its windings and of adopting the very movement of the inner life of things.
VII. This reversal has never been practised in a methodical manner; but a careful study of the history of human thought would show that to it we owe the greatest accomplishments in the sciences, as well as whatever living quality there is in metaphysics. The most powerful method of investigation known to the mind, infinitesimal calculus, was born of that very reversal. Modern mathematics is precisely an effort to substitute for the ready-made what is in process of becoming, to follow the growth of magnitudes, to seize movement no longer from outside and in its manifest result, but from within and in its tendency towards change, in short, to adopt the mobile continuity of the pattern of things.
Generally speaking, industry has not troubled enough about the greater or lesser importance of needs to be satisfied. It simply complied with public taste, and manufactured with no other thought than that of selling. Here as elsewhere, we should like to see a central, organizing intelligence, which would co-ordinate industry and agriculture and allot to the machine its proper place, I mean the place where it can best serve humanity.
Man will only rise above earthly things if a powerful equipment supplies him with the requisite fulcrum. He must use matter as a support if he wants to get away from matter. In other words, the mystical summons up the mechanical. This has not been sufficiently realized, because machinery, through a mistake at the points, has been switched off on to a track at the end of which lies exaggerated comfort and luxury for the few, rather than liberation for all. We are struck by the accidental result, we do not see mechanization as it should be, as what it is in essence.
If our organs are natural instruments, our instruments must then be artificial organs. The workman's tool is the continuation of his arm, the tool equipment of humanity is therefore a continuation of its body. Nature, in endowing us with an essentially tool-making intelligence, prepared for us in this way a certain expansion...Hence the tremendous social, political and international problems which are just so many definitions of this gap, and which provoke so many chaotic and ineffectual efforts to fill it. What we need are new reserves of potential energy–moral energy this time. So let us not merely say, as we did above, that the mystical summons up the mechanical. We must add that the body, now larger, calls for a bigger soul, and that mechanism should mean mysticism. .... Machinery will find its true vocation again, it will render services in proportion to its power, only if mankind, which it has bowed still lower to the earth, can succeed, through it, in standing erect and looking heavenwards.